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A.5.7ISO 27001:2022 Annex ANew in 2022

Threat intelligence

ISO/IEC 27002:2022 attributes

Control type
Preventive · Detective · Corrective
Security properties
Confidentiality · Integrity · Availability
Cybersecurity concept
Identify · Detect · Respond
Operational capability
Threat and vulnerability management
Security domain
Defence · Resilience

Attribute tags as published in ISO/IEC 27002:2022, compiled from public listings — confirm against your licensed copy.

Plain-language summary

New in 2022: gathering and analysing information about the threats relevant to your organisation and turning it into intelligence you act on — in risk assessments, technical defences, testing and awareness — instead of collecting alerts nobody reads.

What the clause is really asking

The point of this control is to stop treating threats as abstract. It asks you to gather information about threats that matter to you and analyse it until it becomes intelligence — something that informs a decision. Three levels are commonly described: strategic (how the threat landscape is changing and who targets organisations like yours), tactical (attacker methods, tools and techniques) and operational (specific campaigns and indicators such as malicious domains, IP addresses and file hashes). Useful intelligence is relevant to you, adds understanding, comes with context and points to an action. The process runs from objectives and sources, through collection and analysis, to the people who use the results — the risk owner, the team configuring email filtering, the awareness trainer. The common misunderstanding is that this needs a paid feed and a security operations centre. A proportionate approach works for most organisations: vendor advisories, CSIRT alerts, sector sharing groups and security tools already licensed. South African sources include alerts from the national Cybersecurity Hub, sector bodies such as SABRIC for banking, and vendors' published threat reports.

What auditors look for

Auditors ask what sources you use and who reviews them, then look for the analysis step — evidence that someone decided what was relevant to your organisation rather than forwarding every alert. They pick a recent item and trace it: received, assessed, acted on, communicated. Typical traces are a phishing campaign that led to an email filter rule and a staff warning, or an actively exploited vulnerability that moved a patch up the queue. They check whether threat information fed the last risk assessment. The hard question: name a threat that changed one of your controls in the past twelve months.

Typical evidence

Threat intelligence procedure with objectives, sources and responsibilities; list of sources and subscriptions; threat log showing items assessed, relevance decision and action taken; records of resulting changes such as blocked indicators, filter rules or patch reprioritisation; threat briefings to management or staff; risk assessment updates citing threat information.

How to comply — recommendations

Write a one-page threat intelligence procedure: what you want to know, which sources you use, who reviews them, how often, and where findings go. Start with free and existing sources — vendor advisories, national and sector CSIRT alerts, your security tools' threat dashboards and annual industry threat reports. Have the security lead review them weekly and log only relevant items with the decision and action: block, patch, warn staff, update a risk. Send a short quarterly threat summary to management and use it in the annual risk assessment. Feed operational indicators into email filtering, firewall and endpoint tools where they support it.

Common nonconformities

No threat intelligence process or defined sources; alerts collected but never analysed for relevance; no record of action taken on threat information; threat information not used in risk assessment; intelligence not passed to those who configure controls or deliver awareness; reliance on a single feed nobody reviews; sources never reviewed for continued relevance.

Related clauses

ISO/IEC 27002:2022 5.7 (guidance); ISO 27001 6.1.2 (risk assessment), 8.2 (performing risk assessment); Annex A 5.6 (special interest groups), 5.25 (assessment of events), 6.3 (awareness training), 8.7 (malware protection), 8.8 (technical vulnerabilities), 8.16 (monitoring activities); NIST CSF 2.0 ID.RA (risk assessment) and DE.AE (adverse event analysis).

Resources for this clause

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