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6.1.2ISO 27001:2022

Information security risk assessment

Plain-language summary

Defining one repeatable method for finding, analysing and ranking information security risks — with written criteria for what is acceptable and how assessments are done — and applying it so that two people assessing the same risk get comparable results.

What the clause is really asking

This is the engine of the standard, and the most common source of Stage 1 findings. The clause requires a defined process with written risk criteria: the risk acceptance criteria (what level of risk the organisation will live with) and the criteria for performing assessments (scales for likelihood and consequence, how they combine, when the assessment is repeated). The process must produce consistent, valid and comparable results every time it is run — the test of a method, not a brainstorm. It must find the risks of information inside the scope losing its confidentiality, integrity or availability, and name a risk owner for each; weigh the possible consequences and the realistic likelihood to arrive at a level of risk; and then compare those levels with the criteria and rank the risks for treatment. The 2022 edition does not require an asset-threat-vulnerability method — scenario or event-based approaches are equally acceptable — but whichever you choose must be written down and followed. Documented information about the process must be retained. POPIA s19 asks the same question in legal language: identify all reasonably foreseeable internal and external risks to personal information.

What auditors look for

Auditors start with the method, not the register: show me the criteria, the scales, the acceptance threshold and who approved them. Then they test repeatability by picking two risks and asking how the scores were arrived at — if the answer is 'judgement', the method is not working. They check every risk has a named owner who knows they own it, that risks cover confidentiality, integrity and availability and not only cyber-attack, that the register reflects the actual scope (the cloud service and the payroll bureau should appear), and that the assessment was repeated at planned intervals and after significant change. A register copied from a template, with the same risks every organisation has, is spotted in minutes.

Typical evidence

Documented risk assessment methodology with acceptance criteria and assessment criteria; the risk register showing identification, analysis (likelihood, consequence, level) and evaluation for each risk; a named owner per risk; dated evidence of repeat assessments; approval of the criteria by management; links from risks to the context, assets and requirements that gave rise to them.

How to comply — recommendations

Write a two-page method first: a 1–5 likelihood scale with worded anchors, a 1–5 consequence scale covering confidentiality, integrity and availability impacts (financial, legal, operational, reputational), a 5×5 matrix, and the acceptance threshold — say, anything 10 and above must be treated. Choose asset-based or scenario-based and stick to it. Run the first assessment as workshops with the process owners, not as an IT desk exercise, and capture the reasoning behind each score so it can be repeated. Name the owner as you log each risk. Set the review cadence (annually and on significant change) in the method and diarise it. The Risk Assessment and SoA Toolkit on the Templates page builds exactly this.

Common nonconformities

No documented risk methodology, or criteria that do not include risk acceptance; scores that cannot be explained or reproduced; risks without owners; register limited to technical threats and ignoring integrity and availability, people, suppliers and physical risks; register not covering the full scope; assessment never repeated or not repeated after major change; template risks with no connection to the organisation.

Related clauses

ISO 27001 6.1.1, 6.1.3, 8.2 (performing the assessment), 5.3 (risk owners), 9.3.2 (results as review input); Annex A 5.7 (threat intelligence), 5.9 (asset inventory feeds the assessment); ISO/IEC 27005 (guidance on information security risk management); ISO 9001 6.1; POPIA s19(2)(a) (identify reasonably foreseeable risks).

Resources for this clause

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